










HOW WILL THE PROPOSED CROP MARKETING AUTHORITY AFFECT
FOOD MARKET PERFORMANCE IN ZAMBIA?  An ex Ante Assessment to
Inform Government Deliberation
J.J. Nijhoff, Gelson Tembo, James D. Shaffer, T.S. Jayne, and Julius Shawa
BACKGROUND:  Concerns about the poor
performance of the smallholder agricultural sector of
the economy has led to a proposal to create a
parastatal organization to be known as the Crop
Marketing Authority (CMA). 
The major crop marketing problems faced by
Zambia’s small-scale farmers are perceived by many
to be low prices and low production of staples,
leading to problems of low real incomes of
smallholder households and food shortages perceived
to result from inadequacies of the markets for staple
crops and agricultural inputs.  The CMA is envisioned
to help smallholders overcome perceived problems of
(1) high costs of marketing, (2) poor access to
markets, (3) market concentration leading to
exploitative practices by traders, and (4) low prices
that result from points 1-3.
OBJECTIVES:  This policy synthesis highlights
some of the key messages contained in the full report
with the same title.
1  I t  a i m s  t o  s u m m a r i z e  t h e
rationale and objectives of the CMA and the possible
consequences of adopting the proposed legislation.
We also identify alternative or additional measures
that the government could take to overcome
constraints in crop marketing.
Although the CMA Concept Note refers to food crops
in general, and highlights the importance of not
focusing entirely on maize, we realize that maize will
inevitably be the biggest tradeable food commodity
that the CMA will handle.  For that reason, the
analysis focuses on maize marketing.
The proposed role and activities of CMA: The
CMA Concept Note states that the CMA will provide
crop marketing support in areas with commercial
potential, in partnership with the private sector, and
by administering reserve stocks, without imposing
major costs on the treasury. Crop marketing activities
would focus on providing crop marketing
opportunities in areas with “commercial potential,”
where the private sector is not sufficiently active. The
CMA Concept Note also specifies that in selecting
commodities and purchase areas, “. . . the economic
viability of production and marketing of specific
crops will be considered, under competitive and
commercial terms. Areas in which it is unprofitable
for farmers to grow maize will not be selected, but in
such areas alternative crops can be identified and
considered, thus promoting crop diversification.”
2
The stated anticipated benefits of the CMA are: (1) to
provide smallholders with a market for their food
commodities; (2) nurture the development of private
sector capacity and (3) increased marketed output of
food commodities for the supply of major
consumption centers to meet expanding food
requirements.
CMA is also intended to maintain strategic reserve
stocks sufficient to ensure market supplies in Zambia
for three months. Given that the private sector also
holds stocks implies that CMA would only need to
store the balance between what the private sector is
likely to stock and the estimated market requirements.
The intended benefits would include improved
national-level food security and reduced inter-
seasonal supply and price instability. Although the
CMA Task Force has proposed not to include input
and credit delivery as part of CMA’s mandate, there
1 Nijhoff et al. 2003. How Will The Proposed Crop Marketing
Authority Affect Food Market Performance in Zambia? An Ex
Ante Assessment to Inform Government Deliberation. FSRP
Working Paper No. 7. Lusaka.
2 For details, see Concept Note on the Crop Marketing
Authority submitted to MACO by the CMA Design Task Force
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are others who have insisted that it be included. This
may include distribution of credit in the form of
fertilizer, similar to the role played by the Food
Reserve Agency since 1997.
The potential geographical areas for increased
marketed maize output by smallholders are spread
among 36 districts.  One objective of some who
promote the CMA proposal is to improve the level of
grain production among smallholders.  Analysis of
Post Harvest Survey data (1999/00 production year)
on district-level maize production and marketing
patterns of small- and medium-scale farmers provides
some indication of where increased market potential
might arise.
3
For analytical purposes, we categorize Zambia’s
districts into the following four categories:
1. Producers in net-purchasing districts, i.e., districts
where more maize is purchased than sold, implying an
importation of maize into the district.  These districts
already receive relatively high market prices since the
sellers are competing with grain imported from
outside the district.  In these districts where import
parity prices prevail, a commercially-oriented CMA
could not expect to increase prices to surplus
producers.  Its impact on maize production would
therefore be very limited.  
2.  Districts where maize is not the primary staple
crop in either production or consumption and where
little is bought or sold are assumed to be in areas not
well suited to grain production (otherwise they would
produce more for their own use) or in areas where
maize is culturally a less important crop. 
3.  Districts that were self sufficient and consumed
relatively high quantities of maize per capita were
assumed to have a proven capacity to produce grain
and would become net exporters of grain with better
market prices.
4. Districts that are already net exporters are assumed
to have clear capacity to produce grain and to be
already connected to the market and could be
expected to expand marketing activity even further
with higher prices. 
Categories three and four would provide expanded
production and marketing potential. There were 36
such  districts in Zambia in 1999/00, a relatively good
production year (see Table 1).
Of the 36 districts with a potential for increased
maize production, 22 districts may be potentially
able to supply maize at a profit to other districts.
These 22 districts are mostly located in Central,
Copperbelt, Lusaka, Eastern and Southern
provinces.  A major function of the CMA is to
provide marketing services as a supplement to the
private market to assure market access to
smallholders. How big an opportunity is there for a
CMA to profitably extend marketing services?  We do
not know for certain.  In order to obtain an estimate,
district-level (median) maize prices received by
smallholder farmers in each district were compared
with median prices in every other district. Using
transport and handling rates and estimated CMA
operating costs, a calculation was made to determine
all of the district pairs for which the difference in
prices was greater than the transfer costs between
these districts, making it potentially profitable to have
moved grain from low- to high-price districts.
According to this analysis, of the 36 districts with a
potential for increased volumes of maize production
(from categories 3 and 4 as described in the previous
section), 22 districts appear to be potentially able to
supply maize to other districts at a profit (see Table
1). The existing positive price differentials suggest
that some trading opportunities may have at least
temporarily existed but were left unexploited. These
22 districts are mostly located in Central, Copperbelt,
Lusaka, Eastern and Southern provinces, which is
largely where the private sector has been known to
concentrate its operations.  However, this does not
mean that all areas within those 22 districts are well
served by markets.  
For the remaining fourteen districts with physical
productive potential to supply maize to the market,
the transfer costs exceed the expected marketing
margins. Under these conditions, these districts cannot
foster a  maize business for the CMA without running
financial losses. Complementary investments in the
infrastructure (such as roads and communications)
and farmer service organizations may be required to
make these districts profitable suppliers of maize.
Alternative strategies other than direct government
participation in buying and selling crops may offer
more cost-effective options. The same is true for the
52 districts we judge as being unlikely to expand
production because of unsuitable soil or rainfall
conditions and/or because it is not possible to raise
producer prices above import parity levels already
prevailing in deficit production areas without
incurring financial trading losses.  The costs and
benefits of offering subsidized producer prices is
examined later in the paper.
3 The PHS is an nationally representative annual survey of
roughly 7,500 small- and medium-scale farm households in
Zambia, conducted by the Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.Page 3
The marketed surplus in rural areas is small and
concentrated. In 16 of the 22 districts with some
potential to expand production, less than 5,000 MT
of maize is typically marketed in a given year. How
will this affect CMA buying operations? The total
rural smallholders’ maize surplus in 1999/00 was
145,000 MT, or only 17% of total smallholder maize
production. The majority (91%) of that surplus
originated from Central, Eastern, Southern and
Copperbelt provinces, mainly servicing the
Copperbelt and Lusaka markets. Marketed sales were
highly concentrated, with 10% of these households
selling 90% of the maize marketed by the small- and
medium-scale sector.  
Because farmers sell maize over a number of months
at different places within districts to a multitude of
buyers (including neighboring households), the
quantities handled by any one marketing agent would
be very small.  This has important economic
significance since the costs of handling and
transporting are much higher for small quantities.
With small individual transactions and small total
sales, relatively few buyers can profitably participate
in a given area.  Of very practical importance for
implementing a program of district  purchasing by
CMA is the question of how many of the districts
have sufficient quantities to support a major
purchasing agent in the district?  The available data
shows that during the 1999/00 production season, a
good production year, smallholders in only eight out
of the 22 districts with maize trade potential made
enough combined maize sales to fill at least one
CIDA shed (5,000 MT). These eight districts are
Chibombo, Mkushi, Mumbwa, Petauke, Choma,
Kalomo, Monze and Mazabuka. All other districts had
much more limited potential with combined sales of
less than 5,000 MT.  In an average or adverse
production year, the quantities to be marketed would
be even lower.  The introduction of a CMA buying
station intent on competing for enough grain
purchases to break even, if successful, would appear
to leave little room for large regional  private market
competitors in most districts. 
Is commodity price support an option for CMA to
promote production and income improvements for
smallholder farmers? Any program intervention
resulting in higher maize prices to sellers of maize
would directly benefit only a small proportion of
farmers.  Only 27% of the small- and medium-scale
farm holdings sold any maize in the 1999/00 season.
These maize sellers are the better off farmers.
Attempts to support prices can have an unsettling
impact on commodity markets, possibly increasing
marketing costs by creating additional uncertainty
among private traders, and artificially narrowing the
trading margin between buying and selling prices.
Simply announcing a support price based upon an
assumption of future funding by the government
would change the plans of traders.  If the funds to
support the announced price level could not be
secured,  those traders acquiring grain, based upon the
announcement, would be left holding the bag.
Traders in turn would be less inclined to participate in
the market, which would reduce competition, or
would require a higher margin to deal with the
increased uncertainty.  Therefore, the operation of a
grain price support program would be inconsistent
with the objective of promoting and facilitating an
efficient competitive private market. 
Grain marketing policies need to recognize the
sources of marketed maize and take into account
the structure of the rural and urban maize market.
Urban smallholders and commercial farmers are
more important sources of maize supply to urban
areas than rural smallholders. The focus in the
CMA proposal and the discussions about the policy
seem to focus exclusively on the smallholder farm
sector, paying little attention to the importance of
production of staple crops by commercial farmers and
urban growers in meeting urban demand. The
production decisions of commercial farmers
especially will influence and be influenced by any
CMA actions affecting market supplies and prices.
Because commercial farmers generally have greater
capacity to respond to changes in incentives, they can
be very important in any policy intended to deal with
prices or production and supply instability. A good
example is the 2002/03 maize harvest, where
commercial farmers responded to market demand and
produced 411,000 MT of maize, which is a significant
portion of urban demand. In addition, some 50,000
MT of maize is estimated to be produced by urban
smallholders. 
The problem of inter-seasonal variations in
production and food security, and the scope of
inter-seasonal reserve stocks.  The objective of the
national food security reserve is to ensure cereal
supplies in the country for a total of at least three
months, which is the period that provides enough lead
time to organize local or imported supplies in case of
food emergencies. A specific function of the reserve
is also to “sell and buy stocks of selected crops as and
when the market requires,” suggesting that the reserve
is used as a market stabilization mechanism.
Food emergencies are part of the production
instability problem, which is in turn caused not only
by the weather, but also by market policies and input
subsidies. If maize production is to become more
stable, it should only be promoted in economicallyPage 4
and agriculturally suitable areas. Crop production in
general could be increased and much of the instability
in production could be reduced by modifying
cropping patterns and practices. Increased production
of sorghum, millets, sweet potatoes and cassava, and
the rapid and widespread adoption of conservation
farming technology are ongoing trends that require
further encouragement. Subsidized fertilizer, which is
essentially free to those not repaying fertilizer loans,
adds to risk and instability. Farmers should not be
encouraged to grow maize with free fertilizer in
drought prone areas. Another factor contributing to
production instability is price risk. During a deficit
season, prices increase and encourage more
production. When the increased production the next
year results in a surplus, there is a risk that prices will
be depressed. In order to mitigate the risk of
depressed market prices, which can be a subsequent
disincentive to plant maize again the next season,
farmers require export opportunities for their maize in
surplus seasons and require an assurance that any
import subsidies or other interventions will not
disadvantage them. This will only work if free
imports and exports are consistently allowed. 
How have the government, donors and the private
sector coped so far, without the food reserve facility
that is proposed? Recent food emergencies have been
dealt with by a combination of efforts by the
government, private sector, and donors, without using
large physical reserve stocks. Despite the name, food
emergencies do not occur overnight. They are
identified in advance, during the growing season,
always with several months’ notice. Therefore,
CMA’s recommended capacity to ensure food supply
for three months while imports are arranged, may be
unnecessarily large. Donors and the government
typically intervene to cater for the needs of
vulnerable groups, mainly in rural areas. As indicated
above, improved policies could actually reduce the
number of households at risk. The needs of the market
have been met through commercial imports by the
private sector, sometimes in conjunction with the
government. Again, improved policies and procedures
could enhance an already existing commercial
capability and market coverage of the private sector.
Hence, it seems that Zambia has the potential to
become food self-reliant without the need to become
food self-sufficient. A policy of food self-reliance
would focus on the ability to meet any food shortfalls
on both the domestic and international markets, while
having the economic capacity to do so by producing
the mix of commodities that maximizes agricultural
growth and stability, thereby reducing the
susceptibility to food security risk. Food self-reliance
would therefore require little or no costly physical
reserves, but rather a financial buffer as well as an
active private sector, stimulated by incentives to
operate to full capacity.
If the government requires some form of reserve, it
could consider holding a financial buffer. If the
objective is to secure and guarantee physical
availability of maize outside Zambia, but within the
region, the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX)
offers suitable instruments such as white and yellow
maize futures contracts and options.
Although the above arguments suggest market-led
national food security management, could there
still be a legitimate role for the government to
facilitate market supplies? The marketing channels
supplying small-scale traders, hammer millers, and
retailers with maize grain, typically become very thin
later in the season when local smallholder production
becomes depleted. In recent years, import channels
were not well designed to supply these informal
channels, and imported maize was channeled
exclusively through large mills (see FSPR Policy
Synthesis No. 5 and No. 6). As a result of this, low-
income consumers, who prefer hammer milled meal,
had no choice but to purchase more expensive
industrially milled meal. To meet the needs of the
poor, there may be a legitimate role for the
government to facilitate the supply of maize to
informal markets in small lots to supply the small
traders and hammer millers. In deficit years, the
government could facilitate the importation of maize,
while in surplus years the government could facilitate
local supplies, when needed.
Is input and credit distribution the answer to
increasing smallholder farmers’ crop production
and incomes? Is it an appropriate function for the
CMA? A recent review of the fertilizer sector by
MACO/FSRP (see FSRP Working Papers No. 4 and
5) suggested that fertilizer distribution alone is not the
“silver bullet.” Furthermore, past experience has
shown that input and credit delivery are a drain on
scarce government resources, and has the potential to
divert those same resources away from CMA’s crop
marketing capability as well as investments needed to
develop the agricultural sector. 
NAMBOARD’s demise and FRA’s failure to achieve
its original food reserve mandate are examples of how
input provision linked to credit resulted in trading
losses and eroded working capital for crop marketing
functions.  It is not at all clear how the CMA would
avoid the political interference in the distribution of
fertilizer as experienced under the FRA and the
Agricultural Credit Management Programme before
it.Page 5
Aspects of financing.  Budget allocations from the
government may become CMA’s constraining factor.
Going by past budget allocations for FRA and the
extremely limited disbursements that were actually
made (rarely exceeding K10 billion in one season),
CMA’s scale of operations in the first seasons may
not exceed 50,000 MT of maize. The important
implication here is that it is crucial for the government
to encourage the private sector to participate in the
market.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: From the analysis it
appears that the scope for CMA to boost maize
production and marketing among smallholder farmers
is limited in terms of geographical coverage as well as
volume. Boosting production through long term price
support (including free fertilizer distribution) in areas
where production would otherwise be unprofitable,
may exacerbate production instability and periodic
food crises, and is not in the interest of long term food
security and smallholder welfare. If CMA is to boost
food crop production with the aim of stabilizing urban
food supplies, production of maize by urban
smallholders and commercial farmers (who sell more
maize onto markets than smallholder farmers) is to be
encouraged. This can only be achieved by providing
incentives to producers, including access to export
markets in surplus seasons to avoid the domestic
market collapsing, and reduced government market
interventions to reduce traders’ risks. At the moment,
it is unclear how or whether food reserve stocks can
be managed in a way that doesn’t make it the object
of patronage activities and erode the private sector’s
participation in the maize marketing system.
Alternatives for consideration of scarce state
resources to address the grain marketing problems
of small-scale farmers:
1.  Undertake a range of public investments that
reduce the costs of marketing in smallholder areas.
These include road investments, supporting the
development of the transportation sector through
reducing taxes on fuel (there is currently a 45% tax on
diesel fuel in Zambia), imported spare parts, and
capital equipment.  Other improvements involve
helping to rehabilitate the railway system and
integrate it with operations in South Africa and
Tanzania.
2. Make a greater commitment to collecting and
disseminating reliable grain market information in the
country.  The existing commitment to the Agricultural
Marketing Information Centre is weak. The Ministry
staff assigned to AMIC is frequently moved to other
positions after being trained in the operation and
management of the system, which impedes progress
and requires extra donor resources to keep the system
functioning.  The development of a reliable and
efficient market information system is an important
role for government in a market-oriented economy.
3.  Reduce the use of ad-hoc export restrictions, that
make investment in holding grain stocks or investing
in marketing facilities too risky to undertake.  
4. Avoid undertaking activities that erode traders’
willingness to invest in the grain marketing system.
Unless government policy changes to one in which
the government is to handle all of the smallholders’
grain, then the private sector’s capacity should be
promoted.  Government operations that compete with
the private sector, but do so in a way that artificially
squeezes the spatial and temporal price spreads that
they face, are likely to erode the private sector’s
participation in markets.
5. Many of the food supply problems appear to be due
to the selection of inappropriate cropping patterns and
practices.  Would investment in selected research,
extension projects designed to identify and promote
improved cropping patterns and practices return more
than comparable investment in the CMA?
Public support of agricultural research and extension
systems is required to generate more fertilizer-
responsive varieties and more appropriate application
recommendation domains would help to reduce the
costs of grain production by smallholder farmers.
This would help to overcome some of the marketing
problems that make maize production (and fertilizer
use on maize) unprofitable in some areas of Zambia
(e.g., Donovan et al., 2002).
These are only examples of relevant questions.
Raising these questions does not represent an
argument for or against the proposed CMA, only an
argument for an informed policy decision.   
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Table 1. Districts with Profitable CMA Maize Trading Potential and Districts with Maize Supply
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Lusaka Province Chongwe Southern, Lusaka
Kafue Southern, Lusaka




Namwala Southern, Lusaka, Copperbelt
Northern Province Mbala Northern Kasama
Mpika
Nakonde
Northwestern Pr. Mufumbwe Northwestern Kasempa
Mwinilunga Northwestern
Source: Based on analysis presented in Nijhoff et al. 2003. How Will The Proposed Crop Marketing Authority Affect Food
Market Performance in Zambia? An Ex Ante Assessment to Inform Government Deliberation. FSRP Working Paper No. 7.
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